Revert renaming symbols in KernelSU driver

- In order to reduce the extra patch code and increase the rate of hunk succeed, we do not rename the symbols in KernelSU drvier but instead do it all in kernel/kallsym.c

- Make susfs_starts_with() global as it maybe useful in future

Co-authored-by: simonpunk <simonpunk2016@gmail.com>

kernel/Kconfig

@@ -141,19 +141,19 @@ config KSU_SUSFS_SUS_KSTAT
       - Effective only on zygote spawned user app process.
 
 config KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
-    bool "Enable to use ksu's ksu_try_umount"
+    bool "Enable to use ksu's try_umount"
     depends on KSU_SUSFS
     default y
     help
-      - Allow using ksu_try_umount to umount other user-defined mount paths prior to ksu's default umount paths.
+      - Allow using try_umount to umount other user-defined mount paths prior to ksu's default umount paths.
       - Effective on all NO-root-access-granted processes.
 
 config KSU_SUSFS_AUTO_ADD_TRY_UMOUNT_FOR_BIND_MOUNT
-    bool "Enable to add bind mounts to ksu's ksu_try_umount automatically (experimental)"
+    bool "Enable to add bind mounts to ksu's try_umount automatically (experimental)"
     depends on KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
     default y
     help
-      - Automatically add binded mounts to ksu's ksu_try_umount.
+      - Automatically add binded mounts to ksu's try_umount.
       - No susfs command is needed in userspace.
       - Only mount operation from process with ksu domain will be checked.
 

kernel/allowlist.c

@@ -266,7 +266,7 @@ bool __ksu_is_allow_uid(uid_t uid)
 
 	if (unlikely(uid == 0)) {
 		// already root, but only allow our domain.
-		return ksu_is_ksu_domain();
+		return is_ksu_domain();
 	}
 
 	if (forbid_system_uid(uid)) {

kernel/apk_sign.c

@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ module_param_cb(ksu_debug_manager_uid, &expected_size_ops,
 
 #endif
 
-bool ksu_is_manager_apk(char *path)
+bool is_manager_apk(char *path)
 {
     return check_v2_signature(path, false, NULL);
 }

kernel/apk_sign.h

@@ -4,6 +4,6 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include "ksu.h"
 
-bool ksu_is_manager_apk(char *path);
+bool is_manager_apk(char *path);
 
 #endif

kernel/core_hook.c

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
 #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
 bool susfs_is_allow_su(void)
 {
-	if (ksu_is_manager()) {
+	if (is_manager()) {
 		// we are manager, allow!
 		return true;
 	}
@@ -133,15 +133,15 @@ static inline void susfs_on_post_fs_data(void) {
 
 static bool ksu_module_mounted = false;
 
-extern int ksu_handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4);
+extern int handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4);
 
-bool ksu_su_compat_enabled = true;
+static bool ksu_su_compat_enabled = true;
 extern void ksu_sucompat_init();
 extern void ksu_sucompat_exit();
 
 static inline bool is_allow_su()
 {
-	if (ksu_is_manager()) {
+	if (is_manager()) {
 		// we are manager, allow!
 		return true;
 	}
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static void disable_seccomp(struct task_struct *tsk)
 #endif
 }
 
-void ksu_escape_to_root(void)
+void escape_to_root(void)
 {
 	struct cred *newcreds = prepare_creds();
 	if (newcreds == NULL) {
@@ -280,7 +280,7 @@ void ksu_escape_to_root(void)
 	spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
 	disable_seccomp(current);
 	spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
-	ksu_setup_selinux(profile->selinux_domain);
+	setup_selinux(profile->selinux_domain);
 }
 
 int ksu_handle_rename(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct dentry *new_dentry)
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ int ksu_handle_rename(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct dentry *new_dentry)
 	pr_info("renameat: %s -> %s, new path: %s\n", old_dentry->d_iname,
 		new_dentry->d_iname, buf);
 
-	ksu_track_throne();
+	track_throne();
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 	}
 
 	bool from_root = 0 == ksu_current_uid();
-	bool from_manager = ksu_is_manager();
+	bool from_manager = is_manager();
 
 	if (!from_root && !from_manager) {
 		// only root or manager can access this interface
@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 	if (arg2 == CMD_GRANT_ROOT) {
 		if (is_allow_su()) {
 			pr_info("allow root for: %d\n", ksu_current_uid());
-			ksu_escape_to_root();
+			escape_to_root();
 			if (copy_to_user(result, &reply_ok, sizeof(reply_ok))) {
 				pr_err("grant_root: prctl reply error\n");
 			}
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 			if (!post_fs_data_lock) {
 				post_fs_data_lock = true;
 				pr_info("post-fs-data triggered\n");
-				ksu_on_post_fs_data();
+				on_post_fs_data();
 				// Initializing Dynamic Signatures
         		ksu_dynamic_manager_init();
         		pr_info("Dynamic sign config loaded during post-fs-data\n");
@@ -525,7 +525,7 @@ int ksu_handle_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
 		if (!from_root) {
 			return 0;
 		}
-		if (!ksu_handle_sepolicy(arg3, arg4)) {
+		if (!handle_sepolicy(arg3, arg4)) {
 			if (copy_to_user(result, &reply_ok, sizeof(reply_ok))) {
 				pr_err("sepolicy: prctl reply error\n");
 			}
@@ -1185,7 +1185,7 @@ static int ksu_sys_umount(const char *mnt, int flags)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_TRY_UMOUNT
-void ksu_try_umount(const char *mnt, bool check_mnt, int flags, uid_t uid)
+void try_umount(const char *mnt, bool check_mnt, int flags, uid_t uid)
 #else
 static void try_umount(const char *mnt, bool check_mnt, int flags)
 #endif
@@ -1227,25 +1227,25 @@ static void try_umount(const char *mnt, bool check_mnt, int flags)
 void susfs_try_umount_all(uid_t uid) {
 	susfs_try_umount(uid);
 	/* For Legacy KSU only */
-	ksu_try_umount("/system", true, 0, uid);
+	try_umount("/system", true, 0, uid);
-	ksu_try_umount("/system_ext", true, 0, uid);
+	try_umount("/system_ext", true, 0, uid);
-	ksu_try_umount("/vendor", true, 0, uid);
+	try_umount("/vendor", true, 0, uid);
-	ksu_try_umount("/product", true, 0, uid);
+	try_umount("/product", true, 0, uid);
-	ksu_try_umount("/odm", true, 0, uid);
+	try_umount("/odm", true, 0, uid);
 	// - For '/data/adb/modules' we pass 'false' here because it is a loop device that we can't determine whether 
 	//   its dev_name is KSU or not, and it is safe to just umount it if it is really a mountpoint
-	ksu_try_umount("/data/adb/modules", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
+	try_umount("/data/adb/modules", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
-	ksu_try_umount("/data/adb/kpm", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
+	try_umount("/data/adb/kpm", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
 	/* For both Legacy KSU and Magic Mount KSU */
-	ksu_try_umount("/debug_ramdisk", true, MNT_DETACH, uid);
+	try_umount("/debug_ramdisk", true, MNT_DETACH, uid);
-	ksu_try_umount("/sbin", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
+	try_umount("/sbin", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
 	
 	// try umount hosts file
-	ksu_try_umount("/system/etc/hosts", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
+	try_umount("/system/etc/hosts", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
 
 	// try umount lsposed dex2oat bins
-	ksu_try_umount("/apex/com.android.art/bin/dex2oat64", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
+	try_umount("/apex/com.android.art/bin/dex2oat64", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
-	ksu_try_umount("/apex/com.android.art/bin/dex2oat32", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
+	try_umount("/apex/com.android.art/bin/dex2oat32", false, MNT_DETACH, uid);
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -1286,7 +1286,7 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
 			// umount for the system process if path DATA_ADB_UMOUNT_FOR_ZYGOTE_SYSTEM_PROCESS exists
 			if (susfs_is_umount_for_zygote_system_process_enabled) {
-				goto out_ksu_try_umount;
+				goto out_try_umount;
 			}
 #endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
 		}
@@ -1341,7 +1341,7 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
 #endif // #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
-out_ksu_try_umount:
+out_try_umount:
 #endif
 	if (!ksu_uid_should_umount(new_uid.val)) {
 		return 0;
@@ -1354,7 +1354,7 @@ out_ksu_try_umount:
  	// check old process's selinux context, if it is not zygote, ignore it!
  	// because some su apps may setuid to untrusted_app but they are in global mount namespace
  	// when we umount for such process, that is a disaster!
-	bool is_zygote_child = ksu_is_zygote(old->security);
+	bool is_zygote_child = is_zygote(old->security);
 #endif
 	if (!is_zygote_child) {
 		pr_info("handle umount ignore non zygote child: %d\n",

kernel/kpm/compact.c

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ int sukisu_is_uid_should_umount(uid_t uid) {
 
 static
 int sukisu_is_current_uid_manager() {
-    return ksu_is_manager();
+    return is_manager();
 }
 
 static

kernel/ksu.c

@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ extern void ksu_trace_register();
 extern void ksu_trace_unregister();
 #endif
 
-int __init ksu_kernelsu_init(void)
+int __init kernelsu_init(void)
 {
 	pr_info("kernelsu.enabled=%d\n",
 		get_ksu_state());
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ int __init ksu_kernelsu_init(void)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-void ksu_kernelsu_exit(void)
+void kernelsu_exit(void)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_CMDLINE
 	if (!get_ksu_state()) {
@@ -142,8 +142,8 @@ void ksu_kernelsu_exit(void)
 	ksu_core_exit();
 }
 
-module_init(ksu_kernelsu_init);
+module_init(kernelsu_init);
-module_exit(ksu_kernelsu_exit);
+module_exit(kernelsu_exit);
 
 MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
 MODULE_AUTHOR("weishu");

kernel/ksud.c

@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ static bool is_boot_phase = true;
 bool ksu_is_compat __read_mostly = false;
 #endif
 
-void ksu_on_post_fs_data(void)
+void on_post_fs_data(void)
 {
     static bool done = false;
     if (done) {
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
                         first_arg);
                 if (!strcmp(first_arg, "second_stage")) {
                     pr_info("/system/bin/init second_stage executed\n");
-                    ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
+                    apply_kernelsu_rules();
                     init_second_stage_executed = true;
                     ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
                 }
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
                 pr_info("/init first arg: %s\n", first_arg);
                 if (!strcmp(first_arg, "--second-stage")) {
                     pr_info("/init second_stage executed\n");
-                    ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
+                    apply_kernelsu_rules();
                     init_second_stage_executed = true;
                     ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
                 }
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
                         (!strcmp(env_value, "1") ||
                          !strcmp(env_value, "true"))) {
                         pr_info("/init second_stage executed\n");
-                        ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
+                        apply_kernelsu_rules();
                         init_second_stage_executed =
                             true;
                         ksu_android_ns_fs_check();
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
         first_app_process = false;
         pr_info("exec app_process, /data prepared, second_stage: %d\n",
                 init_second_stage_executed);
-        ksu_on_post_fs_data(); // we keep this for old ksud
+        on_post_fs_data(); // we keep this for old ksud
         stop_execve_hook();
     }
 

kernel/ksud.h

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 
 #define KSUD_PATH "/data/adb/ksud"
 
-void ksu_on_post_fs_data(void);
+void on_post_fs_data(void);
 
 bool ksu_is_safe_mode(void);
 

kernel/manager.h

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ static inline bool ksu_is_manager_uid_valid()
 	return ksu_manager_uid != KSU_INVALID_UID;
 }
 
-static inline bool ksu_is_manager()
+static inline bool is_manager()
 {
 	return unlikely(ksu_is_any_manager(ksu_current_uid()) || ksu_manager_uid == ksu_current_uid());
 }

kernel/selinux/rules.c

@@ -38,11 +38,11 @@ static struct policydb *get_policydb(void)
 
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(ksu_rules);
 
-void ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules()
+void apply_kernelsu_rules()
 {
 	struct policydb *db;
 
-	if (!ksu_getenforce()) {
+	if (!getenforce()) {
 		pr_info("SELinux permissive or disabled, apply rules!\n");
 	}
 
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static void reset_avc_cache()
 	selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload();
 }
 
-int ksu_handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4)
+int handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4)
 {
 	struct policydb *db;
 
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ int ksu_handle_sepolicy(unsigned long arg3, void __user *arg4)
 		return -1;
 	}
 
-	if (!ksu_getenforce()) {
+	if (!getenforce()) {
 		pr_info("SELinux permissive or disabled when handle policy!\n");
 	}
 

kernel/selinux/selinux.c

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ bool __maybe_unused is_ksu_transition(const struct task_security_struct *old_tse
 }
 #endif
 
-void ksu_setup_selinux(const char *domain)
+void setup_selinux(const char *domain)
 {
 	if (transive_to_domain(domain)) {
 		pr_err("transive domain failed.\n");
@@ -74,12 +74,12 @@ void ksu_setup_selinux(const char *domain)
 	}
 }
 
-void ksu_setenforce(bool enforce)
+void setenforce(bool enforce)
 {
 	__setenforce(enforce);
 }
 
-bool ksu_getenforce(void)
+bool getenforce(void)
 {
 	if (is_selinux_disabled()) {
 		return false;
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void)
 }
 #endif
 
-bool ksu_is_ksu_domain()
+bool is_ksu_domain()
 {
 	char *domain;
 	u32 seclen;
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ bool ksu_is_ksu_domain()
 	return result;
 }
 
-bool ksu_is_zygote(void *sec)
+bool is_zygote(void *sec)
 {
 	struct task_security_struct *tsec = (struct task_security_struct *)sec;
 	if (!tsec) {

kernel/selinux/selinux.h

@@ -8,17 +8,17 @@
 #define KSU_COMPAT_USE_SELINUX_STATE
 #endif
 
-void ksu_setup_selinux(const char *);
+void setup_selinux(const char *);
 
-void ksu_setenforce(bool);
+void setenforce(bool);
 
-bool ksu_getenforce(void);
+bool getenforce(void);
 
-bool ksu_is_ksu_domain();
+bool is_ksu_domain();
 
-bool ksu_is_zygote(void *cred);
+bool is_zygote(void *cred);
 
-void ksu_apply_kernelsu_rules();
+void apply_kernelsu_rules();
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS_SUS_MOUNT
 bool susfs_is_sid_equal(void *sec, u32 sid2);

kernel/sucompat.c

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
 #define SU_PATH "/system/bin/su"
 #define SH_PATH "/system/bin/sh"
 
-extern void ksu_escape_to_root();
+extern void escape_to_root();
 
 static const char sh_path[] = "/system/bin/sh";
 static const char ksud_path[] = KSUD_PATH;
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_sucompat(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
 	pr_info("do_execveat_common su found\n");
 	memcpy((void *)filename->name, ksud_path, sizeof(ksud_path));
 
-	ksu_escape_to_root();
+	escape_to_root();
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -238,7 +238,7 @@ int ksu_handle_execve_sucompat(int *fd, const char __user **filename_user,
 	pr_info("sys_execve su found\n");
 	*filename_user = ksud_user_path();
 
-	ksu_escape_to_root();
+	escape_to_root();
 
 	return 0;
 }

kernel/throne_tracker.c

@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ FILLDIR_RETURN_TYPE my_actor(struct dir_context *ctx, const char *name,
 					apk_data->exists = true;
 					list_add_tail(&apk_data->list, &apk_path_hash_list);
 				}
-			} else if (ksu_is_manager_apk(dirpath)) {
+			} else if (is_manager_apk(dirpath)) {
 				crown_manager(dirpath, my_ctx->private_data, 0);
 				*my_ctx->stop = 1;
 
@@ -327,7 +327,7 @@ static bool is_uid_exist(uid_t uid, char *package, void *data)
 	return exist;
 }
 
-void ksu_track_throne()
+void track_throne()
 {
 	struct file *fp =
 		ksu_filp_open_compat(SYSTEM_PACKAGES_LIST_PATH, O_RDONLY, 0);

kernel/throne_tracker.h

@@ -5,6 +5,6 @@ void ksu_throne_tracker_init();
 
 void ksu_throne_tracker_exit();
 
-void ksu_track_throne();
+void track_throne();
 
 #endif