From be63a062addcc966c835edfb18ec38a8be48e349 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: ShirkNeko <109797057+ShirkNeko@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Sun, 16 Nov 2025 14:25:43 +0800
Subject: [PATCH] kernel: Resolving the issue of unavailable functionality

---
 kernel/ksu.c                  |  4 +--
 kernel/sucompat.c             | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 kernel/syscall_hook_manager.c |  4 +++
 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/ksu.c b/kernel/ksu.c
index 5b2868ad..59744781 100644
--- a/kernel/ksu.c
+++ b/kernel/ksu.c
@@ -70,9 +70,7 @@ int __init kernelsu_init(void)
 
     sukisu_custom_config_init();
 
-#if defined(CONFIG_KPROBES) && !defined(CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS)
     ksu_syscall_hook_manager_init();
-#endif
 
     ksu_workqueue = alloc_ordered_workqueue("kernelsu_work_queue", 0);
 
@@ -109,9 +107,9 @@ void kernelsu_exit(void)
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_KPROBES) && !defined(CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS)
     ksu_ksud_exit();
+#endif
 
     ksu_syscall_hook_manager_exit();
-#endif
 
     sukisu_custom_config_exit();
 
diff --git a/kernel/sucompat.c b/kernel/sucompat.c
index bc1c8e91..b6406952 100644
--- a/kernel/sucompat.c
+++ b/kernel/sucompat.c
@@ -205,8 +205,6 @@ static const char sh_path[] = SH_PATH;
 static const char su_path[] = SU_PATH;
 static const char ksud_path[] = KSUD_PATH;
 
-extern bool ksu_kernel_umount_enabled;
-
 // the call from execve_handler_pre won't provided correct value for __never_use_argument, use them after fix execve_handler_pre, keeping them for consistence for manually patched code
 int ksu_handle_execveat_sucompat(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
                  void *__never_use_argv, void *__never_use_envp,
@@ -214,6 +212,10 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_sucompat(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
 {
     struct filename *filename;
 
+    if (!ksu_su_compat_enabled){
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (unlikely(!filename_ptr))
         return 0;
 
@@ -236,6 +238,10 @@ int ksu_handle_execveat_sucompat(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr,
 int ksu_handle_execveat(int *fd, struct filename **filename_ptr, void *argv,
             void *envp, int *flags)
 {
+    if (!ksu_su_compat_enabled){
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (ksu_handle_execveat_ksud(fd, filename_ptr, argv, envp, flags)) {
         return 0;
     }
@@ -248,6 +254,10 @@ int ksu_handle_faccessat(int *dfd, const char __user **filename_user, int *mode,
 {
     char path[sizeof(su_path) + 1] = {0};
 
+    if (!ksu_su_compat_enabled){
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     strncpy_from_user_nofault(path, *filename_user, sizeof(path));
 
     if (unlikely(!memcmp(path, su_path, sizeof(su_path)))) {
@@ -277,6 +287,10 @@ int ksu_handle_stat(int *dfd, struct filename **filename, int *flags) {
 #else
 int ksu_handle_stat(int *dfd, const char __user **filename_user, int *flags)
 {
+    if (!ksu_su_compat_enabled){
+        return 0;
+    }
+
     if (unlikely(!filename_user)) {
         return 0;
     }
@@ -313,27 +327,31 @@ int ksu_handle_stat(int *dfd, const char __user **filename_user, int *flags)
 
 int ksu_handle_devpts(struct inode *inode)
 {
-        if (!current->mm) {
-                return 0;
-        }
-
-        uid_t uid = current_uid().val;
-        if (uid % 100000 < 10000) {
-                // not untrusted_app, ignore it
-                return 0;
-        }
-
-        if (!__ksu_is_allow_uid_for_current(uid))
-                return 0;
-
-        if (ksu_file_sid) {
-                struct inode_security_struct *sec = selinux_inode(inode);
-                if (sec) {
-                        sec->sid = ksu_file_sid;
-                }
-        }
-
+    if (!current->mm) {
         return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!ksu_su_compat_enabled){
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    uid_t uid = current_uid().val;
+    if (uid % 100000 < 10000) {
+        // not untrusted_app, ignore it
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    if (!__ksu_is_allow_uid_for_current(uid))
+            return 0;
+
+    if (ksu_file_sid) {
+        struct inode_security_struct *sec = selinux_inode(inode);
+        if (sec) {
+            sec->sid = ksu_file_sid;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 0;
 }
 #endif // #ifndef CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS
 
diff --git a/kernel/syscall_hook_manager.c b/kernel/syscall_hook_manager.c
index 4ecb816d..5fdf9608 100644
--- a/kernel/syscall_hook_manager.c
+++ b/kernel/syscall_hook_manager.c
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@ static void ksu_sys_enter_handler(void *data, struct pt_regs *regs, long id)
 
 void ksu_syscall_hook_manager_init(void)
 {
+#if defined(CONFIG_KPROBES) && !defined(CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS)
 	int ret;
 	pr_info("hook_manager: ksu_hook_manager_init called\n");
 
@@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ void ksu_syscall_hook_manager_init(void)
 	} else {
 		pr_info("hook_manager: sys_enter tracepoint registered\n");
 	}
+#endif
 #endif
 
 	ksu_setuid_hook_init();
@@ -352,6 +354,7 @@ void ksu_syscall_hook_manager_init(void)
 
 void ksu_syscall_hook_manager_exit(void)
 {
+#if defined(CONFIG_KPROBES) && !defined(CONFIG_KSU_SUSFS)
 	pr_info("hook_manager: ksu_hook_manager_exit called\n");
 #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
 	unregister_trace_sys_enter(ksu_sys_enter_handler, NULL);
@@ -362,6 +365,7 @@ void ksu_syscall_hook_manager_exit(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_KRETPROBES
 	destroy_kretprobe(&syscall_regfunc_rp);
 	destroy_kretprobe(&syscall_unregfunc_rp);
+#endif
 #endif
 
 	ksu_sucompat_exit();