kernel: use sys_enter tracepoint for sucompat (#533)

* use sys_enter tracepoint for sucompat

* update sucompat rules

* clean tif mark

* mark tif after load allow list

* clear all tif first, then mark target

* Fix shell su

* allow when escape

* fix bugs

* kernel: Resolve logical inconsistencies

---------

Co-authored-by: Ylarod <me@ylarod.cn>
Co-authored-by: weishu <twsxtd@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
ShirkNeko
2025-11-06 12:45:37 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent 0ce7bc2627
commit 5323a500dd
17 changed files with 204 additions and 277 deletions

View File

@@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
#include "linux/compiler.h"
#include "linux/sched/signal.h"
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/task_work.h>
#include <linux/thread_info.h>
@@ -47,6 +49,7 @@
#endif
bool ksu_module_mounted = false;
extern bool ksu_su_compat_enabled;
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
bool ksu_is_compat __read_mostly = false;
@@ -175,6 +178,8 @@ static void disable_seccomp()
void escape_to_root(void)
{
struct cred *cred;
struct task_struct *p = current;
struct task_struct *t;
cred = prepare_creds();
if (!cred) {
@@ -233,6 +238,10 @@ void escape_to_root(void)
#if __SULOG_GATE
ksu_sulog_report_su_grant(current_euid().val, NULL, "escape_to_root");
#endif
for_each_thread(p, t){
set_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT);
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_KSU_MANUAL_SU
@@ -266,6 +275,8 @@ void escape_to_root_for_cmd_su(uid_t target_uid, pid_t target_pid)
{
struct cred *newcreds;
struct task_struct *target_task;
struct task_struct *p = current;
struct task_struct *t;
pr_info("cmd_su: escape_to_root_for_cmd_su called for UID: %d, PID: %d\n", target_uid, target_pid);
@@ -347,6 +358,9 @@ void escape_to_root_for_cmd_su(uid_t target_uid, pid_t target_pid)
#if __SULOG_GATE
ksu_sulog_report_su_grant(target_uid, "cmd_su", "manual_escalation");
#endif
for_each_thread(p, t){
set_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT);
}
pr_info("cmd_su: privilege escalation completed for UID: %d, PID: %d\n", target_uid, target_pid);
}
#endif
@@ -500,6 +514,12 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
return 0;
}
if (new_uid.val == 2000) {
if (ksu_su_compat_enabled) {
set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT);
}
}
if (!is_appuid(new_uid) || is_unsupported_uid(new_uid.val)) {
// pr_info("handle setuid ignore non application or isolated uid: %d\n", new_uid.val);
return 0;
@@ -516,6 +536,9 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
ksu_install_fd();
spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
ksu_seccomp_allow_cache(current->seccomp.filter, __NR_reboot);
if (ksu_su_compat_enabled) {
set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT);
}
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
return 0;
}
@@ -527,6 +550,14 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
ksu_seccomp_allow_cache(current->seccomp.filter, __NR_reboot);
spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
}
if (ksu_su_compat_enabled) {
set_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT);
}
} else {
// Disable syscall tracepoint sucompat for non-allowed processes
if (ksu_su_compat_enabled) {
clear_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT);
}
}
// this hook is used for umounting overlayfs for some uid, if there isn't any module mounted, just ignore it!
@@ -549,7 +580,7 @@ int ksu_handle_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
// check old process's selinux context, if it is not zygote, ignore it!
// because some su apps may setuid to untrusted_app but they are in global mount namespace
// when we umount for such process, that is a disaster!
bool is_zygote_child = is_zygote(old->security);
bool is_zygote_child = is_zygote(old);
if (!is_zygote_child) {
pr_info("handle umount ignore non zygote child: %d\n", current->pid);
return 0;